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The CRISPR-Cas9 Tool of Gene Editing: Cheaper,
Faster, Riskier?
*

Barry R. Furrow

I will focus on whether the CRISPR technique could potentially generate
risky genome edits that could, intentionally or unexpectedly, have negative
effects on human health, genetic traits, and even disrupt entire ecosystems.
Researchers note that the technology is easily accessible, the equipment is
relatively cheap, and not much training is required.' While CRISPR may
well prove safe with further understanding of its operation, regulators must
worry about unexpected risks and side effects, along with abuses by private
parties and governments less careful about research technique and ethical
limits on research.
Genetic research risks are special. 2 Unlike environment harms that usually
produce a by-product causing long term health effects, harms associated with
genetic research present uncertainty about possible catastrophes.3 As I have
previously argued, "[t]he problem of uncertainty is intensified because of the
possibility that research into fundamental biological or physical structures
may alter those structures in a way that does not normally occur in the natural
environment."'
Some excellent work has already been done in laying out principles to
balance the benefits of CRISPR against possible risks, including summits and
National Institutes of Science/Engineering/Medicine reports.' We have
visited this terrain before in the 1970s and 1980s with the rDNA controversy,
where regulatory structures were created and then diminished over time. For
some of the worries created by CRISPR, regulation is available in a
* Professor of Law and Director, the Health Law Program, Kline School of Law a
Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pa. I want to acknowledge the Fellowship
provided by the Brocher Foundation in Geneva, Switzerland, which allowed me to
work with a range of ethicists and scientists on topics such as CRISPR.
1. Heidi Ledford, CRISPR, The Disruptor, 522 NATURE 20, 21 (2015).
2. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U.
PA. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (1983) (arguing that the risks of genetic research are in a special
category).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5.
See, e.g. David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path Forwardfor Genomic Engineering
and Germline Gene Modification, 348 Sci. 36, 36 (2015).
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haphazard way.6 CRISPR critics have already begun to note the range of
risks to be considered and to consider how to fit CRISPR within existing
regulatory structures like the FDA or NIH.' Much conceptual work needs to
be done to properly assess the risks (or lack thereof) attendant on this
remarkable new genetic tool.
I.

CRISPR: A
A.

REMARKABLE

TOOL

The Technology

Genetic engineering holds great promise in treating disease and solving a
host of other problems. Editing genomes with molecular tools has been
possible for some time.' CRISPR, first described in a paper in 2012, turned
out to greatly advance the research tools available for genetic research.9 Its
advantages have become clear - it is easy to use, low in cost, and a more
precise tool for genetic engineering than earlier tools.'o It is a gene splicing
tool that involves modifying an organism's genetic material to alter or
improve its characteristics."" CRISPRs are part of the bacterial immune
system that defends against invading viruses; they are repeating sequences of
genetic code, interrupted by 'spacer' sequences the cell uses to detect and

6.

See generally

SHELDON KRIMSKY, GENETIC ALCHEMY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE

RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY (1982) (discussing the political and social history of the
controversy); see also Judith P. Swazey et al., Risks andBenefits, Rights andResponsibilities:
A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019 (1978)

(detailing the legislative proposals to regulate rDNA research); see also Barbara J. Culliton,
Recombinant DNA Bills Derailed: Congress Still Trying to Pass a Law, 199 SCI. 274 (1978)

(examining the legislative bills).
7.
Sheila Jasanoff et al., Human Genetic Engineering Demands More Than A
Moratorium, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-

science/2015/apr/07/human-genetic-engineering-demands-more-than-a-moratorium
[hereinafter Demands]; see also generally Edward Lanphier et al., Comment, Don 't Edit the
Human Germ Line, 519 NATURE 410 (2015); see also Ledford, supra note 1; see also Sara
Reardon, NIH Reiterates Ban on Editing Human Embryo DNA, NATURE (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.nature.com/news/nih-reiterates-ban-on-editing-human-embryo-dna- 1.17452; see
generallyDaniel Sarewitz, Comment, Science Can 't Solve It, 522 NATURE 413 (2015).
8.
Ledford, supra note 1, at 21.
9.
See Giedrius Gasiunasa et al., Cas9-crRA Ribonucleoprotein Complex Mediates
Specific DNA Cleavage for Adaptive Immunity in Bacteria, 109 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI.
15539, 15539-40 (2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/39/E2579/1.full; see also CRJSPR
Timeline,
BROAD
INSTITUTE
www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-1

spotlight/crispr-timeline (last visited April 17, 2017) (providing a full timeline); see also
Raheleh Heidari et al., CRISPR and the Rebirth ofSynthetic Biology, SCI. & ENG. ETHICS (June
20,
2016),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304171372

CRISPR and theRebirth of Synthetic Biology.
10.
See Michael Specter, The Gene Hackers, NEW YORKER (Nov. 16, 2015), 1
http://www.newyorker.com/nagazine/2015/11/16/the-gene-hackers ("CRISPR has made a

difficult process cheap and reliable. It's incredibly precise.").
11.

Heidari et al., supra note 9.
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destroy invaders 2 When the benefits of Cas9 were discovered the CRISPR
technology really took off in the research laboratory.' 3 The use of Cas9
dramatically improved both the efficiency and accuracy of the CRISPR
technology.
The technology, which can be used to make specific changes in the DNA
of plants and animals, has become instrumental to studying disease systems
in the lab because of its low cost, precision, and ease of use.' 5 Unlike other
genome editing methods, scientists can use it to change any stretch of DNA
in a genome, as long as they know the sequence to target.' 6
CRISPR allows
for rapid development of mouse models for studying the modification of
genetic materials.' 7 Previous tools required up to a year -from designing
the mutated gene to rounds of mouse breeding to ensure that mouse offspring
have the correct genetic mutation." CRISPR is much faster-only two
months are needed for a mouse model, since the components are more easily
introduced into the embryo without using multiple breeding steps.19
CRISPR is an ideal genome engineering technology.2 0 Scientists describe
the benefits as high potency and specificity, broad application to both in vivo
and ex vivo applications, and simple editing tools to speed the process of
scaling and optimizing. 2 1 These traits make CRISPR an incredible tool with
the remarkable ability to modulate genes, address any site in the genome,
target multiple DNA sites simultaneously, and program them to delete, insert
or repair genes.22

12.
Questions
and
Answers
About
CRISPR,
BROAD
INST.,
https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/project-spotlight/questions-andanswers-about-crispr (last visited April 17, 2017).
13.
Ledford, supra note 1, at 20.
14.
See generally ElizabethPennisi, The CRISPR Craze, 341 Sci. 833 (2013).
15.
Ledford, supra note 1, at 20.
16.
See Pennisi, supra note 14, at 835 (stating that virtually any gene can be altered with
Cas9).
17. Id.
18.
Angela She, CRISPR in Neuroscience: How Precision Gene Editing May Unravel
How the Brain Works (and Why it Sometimes Doesn't), HARv.: BLOG, SPECIAL EDITION ON
NEUROTECHNOLOGY
(April 6, 2016), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2016/crispr-inneuroscience-how-precision-gene-editing-may-unravel-how-the-brain-works-and-why-itsometimes-doesnt/.
19. Id.
20.
See Bruce Booth, Riding the Gene Editing Wave: Reflections on CRISPR/Cas9's
Impressive
Trajectory,
FORBES
(May
31,
2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/brucebooth/2016/05/31/riding-the-gene-editing-wavereflections-on-crisprs-impressive-trajectory/#1abf9O9cl41c ("Its simplicity, and its relatively
cheap cost,
make CRISPR an ideal tool to explore myriad genetic manipulations.").
21.
CRISPR/CAS9, INTELLIA THERAPEUTICS, http://www.intelliatx.com/crispr/ (last
visited April 17, 2017).
22.
See generally F. Ann Ran et al., Genome Engineering Using the CRISPR-Cas9
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The excitement felt by biologists was well expressed by the Hinxon
Steering Committee in its report in its description of the wide range of
beneficial uses for CRISPR. Such uses include mitochondrial diseases; early
application to complex diseases with single-target solutions; safer treatment
and screening of single germ cells; and improving reproductive possibilities
where preimplantation genetic diagnosis and in vitro fertilization (PGD-IVF)
is not acceptable for medical or personal reasons.23
To put it another way, CRISPR genome editing in human sperm, eggs and
embryos has tremendous promise in basic research. Embryos can be cultured
with better implantation rates and fewer miscarriages; stem-cell lines can be
developed for research, miscarriages can be prevented, drugs screened for
efficacy, all while reducing the need for using embryos in research; fertility
can be enhanced; and genome editing overall can be improved.24
CRISPR goes beyond human germline editing. One bioengineer noted
that "genome editing shows great promise for next-generation plastics,
agricultural products, bioremediation organisms, carbon-neutral fuels, novel
"125
enzymes, and better vaccines.
CRISPR truly offers a parade of research
advantages with clinical, commercial, and agricultural advantages. Who can
object to such a technology?
B.

The Problem ofRapid Adoption

Biologists have adopted the CRISPR tool with remarkable speed and great
enthusiasm.26 The problem with such a rapid pace of adoption in both public
and commercial laboratories is that the full range of ethical and safety
concerns have yet to be sorted out.2 7 The CRISPR tool of gene editing
improves on the older tools such as the recombinant DNA technology
(rDNA), which made whole genomes readable.2 8 CRISPR holds the promise
System, 8 NATURE PROTOCOL 2281 (2013).
23.
The Nat'l Acads. of Scis. Eng'g & Med., Applications of Gene Editing Technology:
Human Germline Modification (George Church's address at the International Summit on
Human Gene Editing, Dec. 1, 2015), https://vimeo.conalbum/3703972/video/149188798.
24.
See Debra J. H. Mathews et al., A Path through the Thicket, 527 NATURE 159, 160
(2015),
http://www.nature.com/polopoly fs/1.18748!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/1
59-161%20Conment/o20-%/20Hinxton%/`20WF.pdf.
25.
Daniel M. Gerstein, How Genetic Editing Became a NationalSecurity Threat, BULL.
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 25 2016), http://thebulletin.org/how-genetic-editing-becamenational-security-threat9362.

26.
See Ledford, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that CRISPR has led to "rapid progress"
within the research community and that in the past two years, several companies have formed
to develop CRISPR-based gene therapy).
27.
See id. (explaining that the fast pace leaves little time for dealing with these concerns
before experimentation).
28.
See generallyAmy Maxmen, Easy DNA Editing Will Remake the World. Buckle Up.,
WIRED (Aug., 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/crispr-dna-editing-2/.
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of cheap, effective editing-it can "cut and alter the DNA of any species" at
most genomic sites with precision.29 I have written about the risks of genetic
modification technologies before, and CRISPR presents some of the same
risk features of the rDNA controversy, as well as clear benefits for scientific
research and medical development as described above.30
What are the environments in which such tools are valuable? CRISPR
promises the construction of new animals for research, improved bacterial
strains in dairy products, and reduction of disease-generating mutations in
human genes. 3 1 As Jasanoff et al. write: "To many it appears all but certain
that so precise and powerful a technique will revolutionize the treatment of
genetically transmitted human disease, correcting defective genes within
diseased bodies, and potentially banishing genetic errors from the germ-line
by editing the DNA of human gametes and embryos." 32 Biologists and health
care providers are excited.33 If we can help those with traits for rare genetic
diseases, the pressure is enormous to move from the lab into the population
with such traits.
Evidence for the rapid rate of take-up by researchers in academia and
industry can be found in the increase in publications, patents, and funding.3 4
Even stronger evidence is found in the remarkably rapid use of the
technology by startup companies such as Editas.35 The field is hot, and its
rapid movement leaves risk unanalyzed and under regulated in many areas of
the science.36 Universities want research grants for such research; new
biotechnologies are fostered; and another biological arms race begins, driven
by market and research benefits.
The rapid emergence of CRISPR has generated calls for a moratorium or
slowdown in some areas in which the technology is or may be used.37 When

29.
Sheila Jasanoff et al., CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Needfor Inclusive
Deliberation,32 ISSUES IN Sci. & TECH. (2015) [hereinafter CRISPR Democracy].
30. See generally Furrow, supra note 2.
31. See Pennisi, supra note 14, at 833-34.
32. CRISPR Democracy, supra note 29.
33. See CRISPR Will be a Huge Story in 2017. Here Are 7 Things to Look For, SCIPOL
(Jan. 3, 2017), http://scipol.duke.edu/content/crispr-will-be-huge-story-20 17-here-are-7things-look (asking scientists what they believe are the most exciting ways of changing the
world with CRISPR).
34. Ledford, supra note 1, at 23.
35. See Jordan Paradise, U.S. Regulatory Challengesfor Gene Editing, 13 SCITECH LAW.
(2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/scitech lawyer/2016/fall/usregulatorychallenges
gene editing.html ("[Editas has a] $43 million capital investment to design clinical trials
based on the CRISPR and TALEN platforms.").
36. See Ledford, supra note 1, at 20-21 ("[S]ome scientists are worried that the field's
breakneck pace leaves little time for addressing the ethical and safety concerns such
experiments can raise.").
37. Demands, supra note 7.
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Chinese scientists used CRISPR to edit human embryos, controversy erupted
over the implications of such research.38 Worries were expressed about how
to involve the public.39 How do we monitor and gauge risks? What current
regulatory regimes can tackle the technology review process? Some critics
were concerned that relying on research self-regulation might not be ideal,
since scientists do not necessarily represent society's interests, and their own
ambition and links to commercialization of the technology may make them
suspect decision makers.40 Researchers have a conflict of interest with regard
to proper levels of risk assessment. Can CRISPR research in human embryos
be a slippery slope tempting researchers to engage in unsafe, unethical or
non-medical uses of the technique? " Such research offers huge rewards in
research prestige and commercial profitability, fueling possible unsafe
research.
II.

CRISPR RISKS

CRISPR presents at least three broad areas of regulatory concern about
risks: off-target effects; gene drives and biosecurity; and human germline
research and "humanness."4 2
A.

Off- TargetEffects.

The CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing technique works like scissors.43 CRISPRCas9 inserts a protein taken from DNA into the target cell to make cuts near
the gene defect that the scientist wants to alter. A properly functioning gene
segment is then inserted at that point 4 The cutting however may be
imprecise and therefore unpredictable, cutting other genes." The risk is then
that the function of a gene might be changed, making the cell cancerous, for

38. David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Embryo Editing Sparks Debate, 520 NATURE 593,
593 (2015).
39. See Heidari et al., supra note 9, at 7 (stating that accurate public knowledge, which is
difficult to disseminate, is required before democratic legislation can result); see also generally
CRISPR Democracy, supra note 29.
40.
Heidari et al., supra note 9, at 7 (stating that because scientists are not elected, they
do not necessarily represent society's values); see also generally CRISPR Democracy, supra
note 29.
41.
See Ledford, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that because of CRISPR's accessibility and
low cost, researchers must be careful in deciding how to use its power).
42.

Hank Greely, Of Science, CRISPR-Cas9, andAsilomar, STAN. L. ScH.: L. & Biosci.

(Apr. 4, 2015), https://1aw.stanford.edu/20 15/04/04/of-science-crispr-cas9-andasilomar/.
43.
Patrick Skerrett, Experts Debate: Are We Playing With Fire When We Edit Human
Genes?, STAT (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/11/17/gene-editing-embryocrispr/?scampaign-trendmd.
44. Id.
45. Id.
BLOG
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example4 6 The off-target effects could create larger risks than the editing
technique aims to fix. 4 7 The human genome can be altered with unknown

consequences.4 8
B.

Gene Drives and Biosecurity

CRISPR provides a precise method of targeting, snipping, and inserting
exact pieces of a genome. 49 The trait then becomes transmissible from
generation to generation. This means that the use of such "gene drives"
could, for example, reprogram mosquito genomes to eliminate malaria-this
would reverse mosquito resistance to herbicides and pesticides, wiping out
invasive species.o Transgenic mosquitoes could be released to limit the
spread of mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever. 1
CRISPR Cas9 allows for precise cutting of sequences specified by guide
RNA molecules to "edit nearly any gene in sexually reproducing
populations." 52
Preferred traits can rapidly enter a species population; as a result, it is
possible, for example, to reengineer mosquitos so they cannot spread malaria
or plants for drought resistance. Populations of organisms can be altered by
"adding, disrupting, or editing genes or suppressed by propagating treatise
that reduce reproductive capacity." 5 4
The problem of biosecurity is multi-faceted. 5 CRISPR's ease of use and
access to materials means that dangerous outcomes can result from Do-ItYourself (DIY) biology, biohacking, and neighborhood labs. 6 Second,
research on animal species can have effects on entire ecosystems, such as an
altered organism escaping into the wild. 7 Finally, what about weaponization
and the threat of bioterrorism?5
Pathogens could be engineered for
biological attacks on a large scale against humans or against the food supply

46.
Id.
47.
See Gerstein, supra note 25 ("Subtle changes, for example, intended to affect only
genetic diseases, could have unknown consequences.....
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Kenneth A. Oye et al., Regulating Gene Drives, 345 Sci. 626, 626 (2014).
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Gerstein, supra note 25.
54.
Oye et al., supra note 50, at 626.
55.
See generally id.
56.
See Gerstein, supra note 25 (The parade of horribles is quite impressive: creating
diseases in humans, producing disease susceptibility through changes in the immune system,
causing expression of harmful factors for health, to list a few.)
57.
See Gerstein, supranote 25.
Id.
58.
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with devastating effects.5 9 Diseases could be created-engineered pathogens
could sicken or even kill thousands." 60 Some of these concerns require a halt
to practical use of the CRISPR tool until the ecosystem risks are properly
assessed. Bioterror uses fall under the purview of military assessment, which
may be quite capable of evaluating and blocking some uses. 6' The problem
is always one of uncertain risks at the beginning of the spread of new tools
like this.
Gene drives create a wide range of risks. 62 Targeting wild organisms
requires understanding population dynamics and how to maintain stability. 63
Second, alterations could spread to nontarget or related populations. What
are the unintended side effects? 65 Can drive capabilities occur in populations
not originally targeted? 66 Third, could populations of agricultural plants or
livestock be harmed intentionally by bad actors?6 1 While this may be difficult
in industrialized farming, it is more possible in developing countries.68 The
risk is less for altering human populations because of long generation times. 69
Oye et al. recommend a set of risk management steps to protect against
gene drive hazards.70 Current regulation of gene drives rely on approaches
such as "listed-agent-and-toxin approaches," neither of which really cover
the attributes of gene drive risks.' Likewise, U.S. environment regulations
for animal applications are ambiguous; international environmental
conventions fail to define the standard for assessing effects or mitigating
harms; and U.S. security policies fail to cover gene drives within the scope
of the oversight by Dual Use of Research of Concern (DURC). 72
International security conventions rely on narrow lists and fail to address
gene drive risks, and the authors note that "[g]ene drives and most other
advanced applications of genomic engineering do not use proscribed agents
or create regulated toxins and hence fall beyond the scope of operational

59. See id.
60. Id.
61.
See id. (suggesting international laws and treaties that currently govern terrorism and
bioterrorism should incorporate misuse of synthetic biology).
62.
See generally Oye et al., supra note 50.
63. Id. at 626-27.
64. Id. at 627.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68.
See id. (explaining that "[d]eveloping countries that do not use centralized seed
production and artificial insemination could be more vulnerable.").
69. Id.
70.
See id.
71. Id. at 627-28.
72. Id. at 628.
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73
regulations and agreements."

The authors want "lead time" to assess these genomic technologies: they
propose "adopting a function-based approach that defines risk in terms of the
ability to influence any key biological component the loss of which would be
sufficient to cause harm to humans or other species of interest." 74 They
advocate a safety control that slows the risk vector release, proposing that
..concepts and applications should be published in advance of construction,
testing, and release."7 5 This is a good idea that needs an effective risk
management regulatory body to implement.
C.

Human Germ Line Research: The Effect on "Humanness"

Greely summarizes the reasons why human germline genomic
modification is unlikely to be pursued: safety issues, low medical demand
and non-medical demand, and its controversial nature. 6 Such modifications
are constrained by public controversy and unease over manipulating the
human genome.
Critics worry about the side effects of such manipulation
for society, such as the fostering of inequality as rich parents seek to create
enhanced children with improved intelligence or other traits as a result of
germline editing. 8 Is the power of CRISPR to alter genetic makeup going to
outstrip evolution and normal mating? Or is choice and enhancement part of
what we need to survive as the world changes rapidly around us?
Some critics see human germline modification as playing God with core
dimensions of humanness, an action that should not be undertaken without a
robust ethical discussion about what it means.79 In fact, one critic has argued
in fact that nothing "short of a complete and total ban on human germline
modification will do...."s On the other hand, proponents of CRISPR such
as Steven Pinker note that parental selection of offspring traits is nothing
new, and, in his words, "... [g]enetic editing would be a droplet in the
maelstrom of naturally churning genomes."" For example, we allow in vitro

73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Greely, supra note 42.
77.
See id.
78.
Skerrett, supra note 43 (statement by Steven Pinker regarding parents who want to
select the traits for their offspring as a risk of germline editing) ("We affect the genetic makeup
of our offspring, and the species, every time we choose one sex partner over another. And each
of us introduces dozens of mutations into our own germlines by exposing ourselves to
everyday radiation and chemical mutagens. Genetic editing would be a droplet in the
maelstrom of naturally churning genomes.").
79.
See generally Robert Pollack, Eugenics Lurk in the Shadow of CRISPR, 348 Sci. 871
(2015) (discussing concerns that modification opens the door for eugenics).
80.
Id.
81.
Skerrett, supra note 43.
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fertilization to proceed with little regulatory oversight. This is a central
concern, and one that the new NAM Report tackles with some strong
recommendations for regulating such germline enhancement.82
III.

GOVERNING THE RISKS OF NEW SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGIES

A.
1.

Why Does It Matter?

Self-Regulation is Admirable... and Suspect.

If self-regulation has some value in science, it is unclear how it offers any
security in the world of start-up biotech companies or DIY science by
individuals. Earlier controversies surrounding genetic editing, such as the
recombinant DNA debates of the 1970s, involved claims of the
trustworthiness of scientific self-regulation in scientific research.83 Scientists
claimed then that self-governance was effective. If that was so, then freedom
from outside regulation was justified.84 However, the history of the earlier
rDNA controversy over the risks and uncertainties of gene engineering does
not offer much encouragement for reliance on scientific self-regulation.
Susan Wright's conclusion, after her exhaustive historical review of both the
U.S. and British regulatory approaches, was as follows:
The original policies of the United States and the United Kingdom,
although framed narrowly, were unusual in attempting to forestall the
emergence of unknown hazards from a novel form of technology and in
requiring a degree of international cooperation for their success. The
abandonment of those policies signified a return to laissez-faire
development of technology driven primarily by the interests of its funders
and creators and by the conditions of international industrial and scientific
85
competition.

Some of the reasons for the abandonment of regulation, according to
Wright, included the structure of American research-serial competitive
funding made it hard for university researchers to tolerate any form of
regulatory activity which might slow down or limit their access to research

82.
See generally, Comm. on Human Gene Editing: Scientific, Medical, and Ethical
Considerations, Nat'l. Acad. of Sci. and Nat'l. Acad. of Med., Human Genome Editing:
Science,
Ethics,
and
Governance
(2017)
(prepublication),
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24623/human-genome-editing-science-ethics-and-governance
[hereinafter the NAM Report].
83.
See Furrow, supra note 2, at 1409-11.
84.
Id. at 1412.

85.
SUSAN WRIGHT, MOLECULAR POLITICS: DEVELOPING AMERICAN AND BRITISH
REGULATORY POLICY FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING 456 (1994).
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grants." For the industry, global competitive pressures meant a similar
reluctance to tolerate regulatory slowdowns for long.17 Eventually both
industry and academic researchers aligned to reduce NIH power and return
to so-called self-regulation."
The story of CRISPR is likely to follow the path of rDNA technology of
the 70s and 80s. The ferocious frenzy created by a new technology such as
CRISPR that promises patents, riches, and academic fame and celebrity
status is hard to resist. The promises of such a tool tend to suppress long term
efforts at mindful reflection about pace and risks, and cancels out objectivity
even among the best of scientists who hope to benefit from the remarkable
efficiency of CRISPR.
We cannot say that CRISPR does not present a range of risks, and we
cannot safely feel comfortable with the claims of researchers to selfregulatory autonomy in such a case. We need even more with CRISPR - a
systematic theory of institutional regulation of research hazards is required
for differing levels of hazards. The CRISPR controversy, just like the rDNA
controversy before it,89 requires outside oversight to deal with the problem of
research uncertainty in its many dimensions.
2.

Patent Licenses Have Potential.. .and Limits.

CRISPR is still free to be used by industry and academia with few legal or
regulatory constraints, given the slow pace of regulatory developments. This
is changing rapidly as patents are developed for various CRISPR
technologies. Patent disputes and their resolution may affect which of the
commercial entities pursing CRISPR research benefits win and which are
forced to stop.90 The same result may occur with academic research
institutions.9 1 Additionally, litigation over and enforcement of patent rights
may shift the functions of research universities from pure research to
commercialization and profit.9 2 In the words of one commentator, "[t]aken
together, these shifts may complicate the future of gene editing."93
One response to the above critique is to suggest that the use of CRISPR

86. Id. at 454.
87. See id. at 454 ("[T]he most powerful factor, the structure of global industrial
competition, transmitted by corporations that are free to move personnel and capital across
national boundaries, set nations in competition to attract and keep new sources of innovation,
industry, and employment.").
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.
Jacob S. Sherkow, Who Owns Gene Editing? Patents in the Time of CRISPR, 38
BIOCEMIST 26, 28 (2016).
91. Id.at28-29.
92. Id. at 29.
93. Id.
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patent licenses provides a beneficial form of self-regulation, reducing the
need for external government regulation.94 The use of patent licensing to
limit applications of CRISPR has not previously been considered in the
policy discussions to date.95
Entering this policy vacuum, the Broad
Institute, which holds several key patents on the CRISPR technology, has
begun to license its CRISPR patent portfolio, first to Monsanto. 96 Their
license restricts socially controversial applications, as they define such
applications.97 During the period of the patent term, a research entity may
not develop an invention without first seeking and receiving a license from
the Broad Institute.98
The Broad Institute will license non-exclusive research and commercial
use of its patented CRISPR use in agriculture, subject to three limits. 99 First,
the technology may not be used for gene drive.' 00 Second, it may not be used
to create sterile seeds.' 0 ' Third, it may not be used to modify tobacco for any
uses except creating a model organism and manufacturing non-tobacco
products. 102
This kind of licensing agreement effectively limits potentially
controversial uses of patented technologies.103 The benefits are real. The
process is relatively quick, as the patent holder holds the decisional power
and can anticipate some negative uses of the patient.' 0 4 The license is
enforceable in court and penalties can be built into the license.io The license
can be specifically tailored to the concerns of both parties. 0 6 Lastly, the
license is negotiated between the parties, rather than through the fractious

94.

See Christi J. Guerrini et al., The Rise of the Ethical License, 35 NATURE
22, 23 (2017) (explaining that a solution may exist in "using patent licenses
to restrict socially controversial applications of a technology") [hereinafter EthicalLicense].
95. See id ("Notably, the use of patent licensing to limit applications has not yet entered
the national or international policy conversation.").
96. Monsanto Licenses CRISPR/Cpfl from BroadInstitute, GENOMEWEB (Jan. 4, 2017),
https://www.genomeweb.com/business-news/monsanto-licenses-crisprcpfl -broad-institute.
97.
See Christi Guerrini, Licensing 'CRISPR' Patents to Promote Public Interests,
BAYLOR C. OF MED. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://blogs.bcm.edu/2017/01/18/licensing-crisprpatents-promote-public-interests/ (explaining that Broad's license to Monsanto contains
various restrictions on use).
98. Ethical License, supra note 94, at 23.
99. Issi Rosen, Licensing CRISPR for Agriculture: Policy Considerations,BROAD INST.
(Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.broadinstitute.org/news/licensing-crispr-agriculture-policyconsiderations.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102. Id.
103.
EthicalLicense, supra note 94, at 23.
104. Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
BIOTECHNOLOGY
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process required by administrative regulations and statutes.o 7 As a model of
contract law regulation, it can effectively constrain some negative lines of
research through enforcement of breach of the licensing agreement.
The limitations from a public policy perspective are also substantial. 0
The value of the patent will be affected by the license constraints, weakening
the market value of the patent.109 Second, the patent holder has to assess
often competing ethical and risk perspectives of other stakeholders."1 0 This
puts the patent holder in an uncomfortable quasi-regulatory position, and is
likely to limit the effective use of such licensing agreements."' After all,
most patent holders want to make money from their patents, not regulate their
use by others.11 2 It is unlikely that we can rely on patent licensing agreements
to resolve concerns about the risks of CRISPR or to control them in any
significant way.
3.

Summits and Academy Reports Are a Start... .but Are Not
Regularized

Regulatory bodies are involved in various aspects of CRISPR
applications." 3 The FDA regulates genetic technologies;" 4 NIH and NSF
funding control the flow of research by amplifying its reach through grants.
This regulatory environment is inescapably chaotic-agencies with
overlapping jurisdictions, regulations developed for other rather different
technologies, and often with no coherent central process for evaluating and
collecting data on the risks of this genomic editing tool."' Given the ease of
application of CRISPR to DIY researchers, there can be a parade of horribles
that moves far beyond human germline editing to produce "improved"
biological entities." 7 We can acknowledge that there are effective regulatory
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.

110.
111.

Id.
Id.

112.
Id.
113.
See e.g. Paradise, supra note 35; see also Alta R. Charo, The Legal and Regulatory
Context for Human Gene Editing, 32 ISSUES Sci. & TECH. 39,39 (2016) (explaining that gene

editing is regulated by "an ecosystem that is made up of government, the public, and private
industry. . .").
114.
See Charo, supra note 113, at 40 (explaining that the FDA regulates gene therapy

and the sale of genetically modified food like salmon).
115.
116.
AM. J.

See Furrow, supra note 2, at 1405.
See R. Alta Charo & Henry T. Greely, CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks, 15
BIOETHICS 11, 14-15 (2015), (describing the difficulty of determining the correct

regulatory body to address CRISPR).
117.

See generally Skerrett, supra note 43 (experts discussing potential harms); see also

generally Charo & Greely, supra note 116 (discussing range of problems with the use of
CRISPR for uses outside of human germ line editing).
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islands-the FDA has power to regulate curative genetic tools, NIH certainly
imposes controls through its control of funding streams, and so on, but we
must acknowledge that large gaps still exist."'
The flurry of meetings, "summits," and other linked activities makes it
appear that wise scientists and academics are indeed sorting through the risks
and downsides of CRISPR. But many of the participants are scientists with
a long term interest in the success of CRISPR in enhancing their own research
success. Such ad hoc processes are just that, called into action briefly but
without the capacity of in-depth review or continuity.
B.

Renewing the Power of Technology Assessment

Given the limits of self-regulation and the peculiar uncertainties attendant
upon research, a regulatory vacuum is undesirable. Some systematic means
of evaluating risks is necessary. I will develop five criteria for evaluating a
genetic tool such as CRISPR." 9 First, a brake or governor is needed to slow
rapid development, whether through scientists' own restraint or outside
pressures from government or professional organizations. A means to trigger
that "governor"-a method by which the expansion of research can be
checked in order to allow more careful evaluation of risks, benefits, and
future developments-will also be necessary. Public control through funding
agencies such as NIH certainly provides some regulatory controls and brakes
potentially hazardous research. However, most industrial research is not
touched by these funding streams, and as basic research is done either by
industry or through industrial-academic cooperation, any controls through
funding are weakened. It is also clear that federal funding decisions represent
the value judgments of the scientific community involved in the peer review
process, and the earlier rDNA controversy showed that the attitude of the
U.S. funding agencies became one of speeding up research, not waiting for
analysis of uncertain risks.1 2 0
Uncertainty in scientific research like CRISPR includes a range of risksfrom human germline modification effects to agricultural harms. We need
an institutional mechanism that can suspend or slow some kinds of research
while thorough study is undertaken as to the nature of the research risks and
modes of reduction, if any. What I earlier advocated with regard to rDNA
research is equally applicable to CRISPR varieties of research: we need ".. .a
more deliberate, explicit, and somewhat more pessimistic consideration of
the area of uncertainty as to potential hazards, triggered by some mechanism

118.
Charo & Greely, supra note 116, at 14.
119.
This discussion of criteria is heavily based on my earlier discussion in Governing
Science. Furrow, supra note 2.
120. See Wright, supra note 85, at 456 (explaining that the abandonment of early policies
exemplified the importance of industrial advancement and scientific achievement).
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to focus attention on the putative hazards of research and to mobilize
resources for further inquiry, while dampening the momentum which a
promising line of research accumulates."'21
Second, scientific bias in favor of a hot new technology needs to be
counteracted. Some external entity, like the former Office of Technology
Assessment, can offer a systematic approach to risk assessment. Researchers
in academic and industry have a vested interest in the research, inescapably,
and their biases needed to be counterbalanced by a neutral regulatory body.1 2 2
Third, an external review organization needs the time and resources to
conduct the technology assessment, to generate a full and complete record on
the risks, and to give voice to all the interests involved, including the public.
Fourth, public participation in some form is needed, as Jasanoff et al.
suggest.1 23 The extent of public participation has often been cited as a goal
against which to measure various approaches to technological problems.1 2 4
Public participation has many benefits.1 25 First, alternative viewpoints may
offer new perspectives.1 26 Second, in a partisan political world where elites
are viewed with suspicion, real public participation may increase public
confidence in the decision-making process.1 2 7 Third, we want to find ways
to give individuals some form of say in risks, even if the conclusion of a
public process is that the risks are low, or are well worth encountering once
understood.1 28 Fourth, an ethical framework is needed to consider the longterm effects of CRISPR on human populations, where germline editing
allows the transfer of new traits to future generations.1 2 9
Suppose we consider a moratorium such as Hank Greely has suggested.' 30
Will the academic laboratories be joined by the private companies who have
gambled with venture capital money on the possibilities of breakthrough
treatments? It is easier to outline relevant values to consider in assessing a
121. Furrow, supra note 2, at 1421 (surveying the problem of regulating emerging risks
in the face of uncertainty).
122. Id.
123.
See generally CRISPR Democracy, supra note 29.
124.
See generally DOROTHY NELKIN, TECHNOLOGICAL DECISIONS AND DEMOCRACY:
EUROPEAN EXPERIMENTS IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1977).

125.
Furrow, supra note 2, at 1422.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
See generally Charis Thompson, Governance, Regulation, and Control: Of Which
People, By Which People, For Which People? International Sumnit on Human Gene Editing,
Washington, D.C. December 2015 (explaining that these conversations need to include
everyone, not just stakeholders).
129.
We have seen some excellent first steps with the NAM Report sections written by
bioethicists on the Committee, as well as some earlier writings, e.g. Charo & Greely, supra
note 116, at 14-15; Niklaus H. Evitt, et al., Human Germline CRISPR-Cas Modification:
Toward aRegulatory Framework, 15 AM. J. BIOETHICS 25, 25 (2015).
130.
Greely, supra note 42.
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new technology than it is to imagine a regulatory structure that could apply
them effectively. Today's regulatory environment in the U.S. consists of
agencies with overlapping jurisdictions coupled with international
agreements with a taxonomy of limitations and signatories.' 3 ' Lacking a
central oversight authority, CRISPR risks may be disregarded or not detected.
IV.

2017

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF SCIENCE,
(NAM REPORT).

ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE

The CRISPR technology has been analyzed by summits, conferences, and
finally, a Consensus Statement development process by the Academies of
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 32 This has been an impressive assault
on the uncertainty issues raised by CRISPR. But is it representative? Is it
critical of aspects of this remarkably efficient tool? Is public participation
considered in the membership of the panel?' 33
The expert process created by the NAS and the NAM has culminated in a
lengthy monograph on the variety of dimensions of CRISPR. 3 4 It is, in the
words ofthe NAS and NAM, a study conducted by a committee of experts.' 35
The directive for the study was as follows:
It will perform its own independent and in-depth review of the science and
policy of human gene editing by reviewing the literature and holding datagathering meetings in the U.S. and abroad to solicit broad input from
researchers, clinicians, policymakers, and the public. The committee will
also monitor in real-time the latest scientific achievements of importance
in this rapidly developing field. Finally, while informed by the statement
issued by the organizing committee for the international summit, the study
committee will have broad discretion to arrive at its own findings and
conclusions, which will be released in a peer-reviewed consensus
report.1 36

The NAM Report, issued early in 2017, focuses exclusively on human
applications of CRISPR.1 3 7 The three academies that issued the NAM Report
work together, in their words, "...to provide independent, objective analysis
and advice to the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex
problems and inform public policy decisions. The National Academies also

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
MED.

Charo & Greely, supra note 116, at 14-15.
The NAM Report, supra note 82.
CRISPR Democracy, supra note 29.
See generally The NAM Report, supra note 82.
Id. at iv.
Human Gene Editing:Scientific, Medical, and Ethical Considerations,NAT'L ACAD.

(2016)
considerations/.
137.

https://nam.edu/event/human-gene-editing-scientific-medical-and-ethical-

The NAM Report, supra note 82, at 1.
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encourage education and research, recognize outstanding contributions to
knowledge, and increase public understanding in matters of science,
engineering, and medicine."' 38 The NAM Report was written by a committee
of twenty-two experts (legal academics, bioethicists, biologists, and
bioengineering company leaders). 3 9 It was reviewed by twelve excellent
academics and lawyers to ensure that review comments were considered.1 40
It is a first class document: it summarizes the science clearly, it outlines the
issues for human germline editing, and it makes specific recommendations.
It is a one-off document by a working group under the NAM/E/S auspices.' 4
The authors note that other studies are underway by the NAS and the NAM,
including agricultural uses, gene drive issues, animal genome modification,
and future biotechnology products. 142
The report starts with a sanguine observation about the lack of need for
regulation of human genome editing: it notes that CRISPR research requires
high quality laboratories and medical facilities and this inevitably ensures
regulatory oversight.1 43 The report then observes that marketing of therapies
using human genome editing products will need regulatory review and
approvals. Such marketing will require regulatory bodies with the legal
authorship, commitment and political support to block marketing of
unapproved genome editing products. i
The Report takes the position that existing regulatory infrastructure and
processes are sufficient for evaluating gene therapy using genome editing. 141
Uses should however be limited to treatment or prevention of disease or
disability. '

6

And the Report proposes public participation in some form

before CRISPR can be used beyond disease treatment or prevention.1 47
The use of inheritable germline editing is viewed as problematic at this
point. 48 The Report notes the disquiet that surrounds this use that can affect
multiple generations and asks whether "enhancement" uses should be limited
or prohibited.1 49 Recommendation 6-1 proposes a moratonum on somatic or
germline editing, while Recommendation 6-2 wants public discussion and

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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policy debate.'

The Report offers a detailed look at public participation-theory, existing
practice, and possibilities in the CRISPR context.15 ' The Report ultimately
proposes a strong public participation model, to be developed.
Recommendation 7-1 states: "Extensive and inclusive public participation
should precede clinical trials for any extension of human genome editing
beyond treatment or prevention of disease or disability."1 52
V.

REINVENTING THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

Can we do better than using the National Institutes? The NAM Report is
a thorough and well documented look at a worrisome aspect of the CRISPR
tool, with other reports to follow. The authors are a well-respected and
diverse group. I argue, however, that we need a standing agency that (1)
promotes strong versions of public engagement in its design, (2) has an
institutional memory, and (3) a staff familiar with a wide range of technology
assessment problems would be preferable.
I propose that we reconstitute a new and improved Federal Office of
Technology Assessment to provide a coherent framework for evaluating the
risks of technologies like CRISPR in all of its possible applications.1 53 The
original Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) issued a wide range of
valuable reports to assist Congress in evaluating thorny issues, but in 1995 it
was closed.' 5 4 Congress can now use the Congressional Research Service
and the General Accounting Office in the absence of the now defunct OTA,
but these offices do not provide the detail that is needed for difficult
technological assessments, the depth of research, or the range that scientific
uncertainty requires. * As Sclove writes: "Congress is indeed awash in
information and analysis, including scientific and technical analysis, but
lacks a trustworthy mechanism for evaluating, distilling and synthesizing this
information."is 6
Adding another regulatory body to the world of U.S. government
regulation will be met with political opposition. On the other hand, the model
150.
151.
152.
153.
Killed

Id. at 123.
Id. at 127-29, 130-31, 134.
Id. at 136.
Jathan Sadowski, The Much-Needed and Same CongressionalOffice that Gingrich
Off and We
Need Back,
TE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
26,
2012),

https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/10/the-much-needed-and-sanecongressional-office-that-gingrich-killed-off-and-we-need-back/264160/;
see
generally
RICHARD SCLOVE, WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, REINVENTING TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT: A 2 1 ST CENTURY MODEL, (April 2010) (proposing an improved model of the

Office of Technology Assessment).
154.
155.
156.

See SCLOVE, supra note 153, at page vii (Executive Summary).
See Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 19.
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of an agency of technology assessment is based on solid experience with the
OTA of the past, a form which can be improved to better serve the needs of
scientific and technological assessment.' 5 7 And it would better integrate the
current morass of regulatory initiatives that govern the uncertain risks of
CRISPR only glancingly, leaving large regulatory holes in the risk analysis.
Congress can use the Congressional Research Service and the General
Accounting Office in the absence of the now defunct OTA, but neither
provides the staff and the long-term attention span needed for difficult
technological assessments. The need for an independent agency review and
ongoing investigation of a technology like CRISPR is justified by the wide
range of possible misfires of the technology may create. Sclove notes that
all realms of human experience might be affected, and "... [a] well-crafted
TA capability can assist citizens and decision-makers in understanding these
kinds of broad and deep implications of technological innovation
implications that might otherwise escape attention until well after they, too,
have become entrenched." 5 8
An improved model of the Office of Technology Assessment offers a
coherent model for an agency with broad experience with a range of
technologies and with public engagement, one better equipped to
counterbalance the biases of those who are fans of the technology as a
research tool. A central purpose of a revived OTA would be to justify and
propose moratoria on new research developments that may pose risks that
need to be studied.1 59 Since CRISPR may just be the first in a series of
technologies with huge benefits and uncertain risks; a federal capacity to
assess such new technologies is sorely needed under any political
administration, regardless of political affiliation.
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